UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL RENE VAUGHN HEW,

Plaintiff,

-against
WALMART CORPORATION, et. al,

Defendants.

Defendants.

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JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

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On January 8, 2015, *pro se* plaintiff Michael Rene Vaughn Hew ("plaintiff") commenced this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By Order dated June 9, 2015, the Court directed plaintiff to submit a letter to the Court no later than June 30, 2015, explaining why this case should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff failed to do so, or to otherwise communicate with the Court. For the reasons set forth below, therefore, the Court dismisses plaintiff's complaint *sua sponte*, under the Court's inherent power, for failure to prosecute under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court has stated that a district court can dismiss an action *sua sponte* for failure to prosecute. *See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991) ("[A] federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case *sua sponte* for failure to prosecute, even though the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) appeared to require a motion from a party." (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962))). Rule 41(b) authorizes a

district court to "dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a court order, treating the noncompliance as a failure to prosecute." Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 633); see Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[D]ismissal [pursuant to Rule 41(b)] is a harsh remedy and is appropriate only in extreme situations."); Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Rule [41(b)] is intended to serve as a rarely employed, but useful, tool of judicial administration available to district courts in managing their specific cases and general caseload."); see also Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1943) (citing Blake v. De Vilbiss Co., 118 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1941)); Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 1942) ("The cited rule [41(b)] enunciates a wellsettled [sic] concept of practice that a court of equity, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, has general authority . . . to dismiss a cause for want of diligence in prosecution or for failure to comply with a reasonable order of the court made in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.").

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Courts have repeatedly found that "[d]ismissal of an action is warranted when a litigant, whether represented or instead proceeding *pro se*, fails to comply with legitimate court directives" *Yulle v. Barkley*, No. 9:05-CV-0802, 2007 WL 2156644, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (citations omitted). A district court contemplating dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute and/or to comply with a court order pursuant to Rule 41(b) must consider:

1) the duration of plaintiff's failures or non-compliance; 2) whether plaintiff had notice that such conduct would result in dismissal; 3) whether prejudice to the defendant is likely to result; 4) whether the court balanced its interest in managing its docket against plaintiff's interest in receiving an opportunity to be heard; and 5) whether the court adequately considered the efficacy of a sanction less draconian than dismissal.

Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535; Jackson v. City of N.Y., 22 F.3d 71, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1994). In deciding whether dismissal is appropriate, "[g]enerally, no one factor is dispositive." Nita v. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994); see Peart, 992 F.2d at 461 ("[D]ismissal for want of prosecution is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge [and] the judge's undoubtedly wide latitude is conditioned by certain minimal requirements." (quoting Merker v. Rice, 649 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1981))).

Here, plaintiff failed to respond to the Court's June 9, 2015 Order, which explicitly directed plaintiff to indicate why this case should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Thus, plaintiff has shown no interest in continuing with this action. Under these circumstances, no sanction less than dismissal will alleviate the prejudice to defendant of continuing to keep this action open. Moreover, the Court needs to avoid calendar congestion and ensure an orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Therefore, all the above-referenced factors favor dismissal of the instant case. However, under the circumstances described above, the lesser sanction of dismissal without prejudice (rather than with prejudice) is appropriate in order to strike the appropriate balance between the right to due process and the need to clear the docket and avoid prejudice to defendant by retaining open lawsuits with no activity.

In sum, dismissal for failure to prosecute is clearly warranted. This case is dismissed without prejudice, under the Court's inherent power, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED.

JOSEPH E BIANCO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated:

July 15, 2015

Central Islip, New York